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The Strategic LQG System: A Dynamic Stochastic VCG
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Ke Ma and P. R. Kumar ∗†
Abstract
The classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mecha-
nism ensures incentive compatibility, i.e., that truth-
telling of all agents is a dominant strategy, for a static
one-shot game. However, in a dynamic environment
that unfolds over time, the agents’ intertemporal pay-
offs depend on the expected future controls and pay-
ments, and a direct extension of the VCG mechanism
is not sufficient to guarantee incentive compatibility. In
fact, it does not appear to be feasible to construct mech-
anisms that ensure the dominance of dynamic truth-
telling for agents comprised of general stochastic dy-
namic systems. The contribution of this paper is to show
that such a dynamic stochastic extension does exist for
the special case of Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian (LQG)
agents with a careful construction of a sequence of lay-
ered payments over time.
We propose a layered version of a modified VCG
mechanism for payments that decouples the intertem-
poral effect of current bids on future payoffs, and prove
that truth-telling of dynamic states forms a dominant
strategy if system parameters are known and agents are
rational.
An important example of a problem needing such
optimal dynamic coordination of stochastic agents
arises in power systems where an Independent System
Operator (ISO) has to ensure balance of generation and
consumption at all time instants, while ensuring social
optimality (maximization of the sum of the utilities of all
agents). Addressing strategic behavior is critical as the
price-taking assumption on market participantsmay not
hold in an electricity market. Agents, can lie or other-
wise game the bidding system. The challenge is to deter-
mine a bidding scheme between all agents and the ISO
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that maximizes social welfare, while taking into account
the stochastic dynamic models of agents, since renew-
able energy resources such as solar/wind are stochastic
and dynamic in nature, as are consumptions by loads
which are influenced by factors such as local tempera-
tures and thermal inertias of facilities.
1. introduction
Mechanism design is the sub-field of game theory
that considers how to implement socially optimal so-
lutions to problems involving multiple self-interested
agents, each with a private utility function. A typical
approach in mechanism design is to provide financial
incentives such as payments to promote truth-telling of
utility function parameters from agents. Consider for
example the Independent System Operator (ISO) prob-
lem of electric power systems in which the ISO aims to
maximize social welfare and maintain balance of gen-
eration and consumption while each generator/load has
a private utility function. The classic Vickery-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism [1] has played a central role
in classic mechanism design since it ensures incentive
compatibility, i.e., truth-telling of utility functions of all
agents forms a dominant strategy, and social efficiency,
i.e., the sum of utilities of all agents is maximized. In-
deed, the outcome generated by the VCG mechanism
is stronger than a Nash equilibrium in the sense that
it is strategy-proof, meaning that truth-telling of utility
functions is optimal irrespective of what others are bid-
ding. In fact, Green, Laffont and Holmstrom [2] show
that VCG mechanisms are the onlymechanisms that are
both efficient and strategy-proof if payoffs are quasi-
linear.
While the VCG mechanism is applicable to a static
one-shot game, it does not work for stochastic dynamic
games. In a dynamic environment that unfolds over
time, the agents’ intertemporal payoffs depend on the
expected future controls and payments, and a direct ex-
tension of the VCG mechanism is not sufficient to guar-
antee incentive compatibility. A fundamental difference
between dynamic and static mechanism design is that in
the former, an agent can bid an untruthful utility func-
tion conditional on his past bids (which need not be
truthful) and past allocations (from which he can make
an inference about other agents’ utility functions). Here
we should note that for dynamic deterministic systems,
by collecting the VCG payments as a lump sum of all
the payments over the entire time horizon at the be-
ginning, incentive compatibility is still assured. How-
ever, for a dynamic stochastic system, the states are
private random variables and there is no incentive for
agents to bid their states truthfully if VCG payments
are collected in the same way as for dynamic determin-
istic systems. In fact, it does not appear to be feasible
to construct mechanisms that ensure the dominance of
dynamic truth-telling for agents comprised of general
stochastic dynamic systems.
Nevertheless, for the special case of Linear-
Quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) agents, where agents have
linear state equations, quadratic utility functions and
additive white Gaussian noise, we show in this paper
that a dynamic stochastic extension of the VCG mech-
anism does exist, based on a careful construction of a
sequence of layered payments over time. For a set of
LQG agents, we propose a modified layered version of
the VCG mechanism for payments that decouples the
intertemporal effect of current bids on future payoffs,
and prove that truth-telling of dynamic states forms a
dominant strategy if system parameters are known and
agents are rational. “Rational” means that an agent will
adopt a dominant strategy if it is the unique one, and it
will act on the basis that it and others will do so at future
times.
An important example of a problem needing such
optimal dynamic coordination of stochastic agents
arises in the ISO problem of power systems. In general,
agents may have different approaches to responding to
the prices set by the ISO. If each agent acts as a price
taker, i.e., it honestly discloses its energy consump-
tion at the announced prices, a competitive equilibrium
would be reached among agents. However, when each
agent becomes a price anticipator, and it is critical for
the ISO to design a market mechanism that is strategy-
proof (i.e., incentive compatible). The challenge for
the ISO is to determine a bidding scheme between all
agents (producers and consumers) and the ISO that
maximizes social welfare, while taking into account the
stochastic dynamic models of agents, since renewable
energy resources such as solar/wind are stochastic and
dynamic in nature, as are consumptions by loads which
are influenced by factors such as local temperatures and
thermal inertias of facilities. Currently, the ISO solicits
bids from generators and Load Serving Entities (LSEs)
and operates two markets: a day-ahead market and a
real-time market. The day-ahead market lets market
participants commit to buy or sell wholesale electric-
ity one day before the operating day, to satisfy energy
demand bids and to ensure adequate scheduling of re-
sources to meet the next day’s anticipated load. The
real-time market lets market participants buy and sell
wholesale electricity during the course of the operating
day to balance the differences between day-ahead com-
mitments and the actual real-time demand and produc-
tion [3]. Our layered VCG mechanism fits perfectly in
the real-time market, as we will see in the sequel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, a survey of related works is presented. This
is followed by a complete description of the classic
VCG framework for the static and dynamic determin-
istic problem in Section 3. A layered VCG payment
scheme is introduced for the dynamic stochastic prob-
lem in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Related Works
In recent years, several papers have been written
with the aim of exploring issues arising in dynamic
mechanism design. In order to achieve ex post incen-
tive compatibility, Bergemann and Valimaki [4] pro-
pose a generalization of the VCG mechanism based
on the marginal contribution of each agent and show
that ex post participation constraints are satisfied under
some conditions. Athey and Segal [5] consider a sim-
ilar model and focus on budget balance of the mech-
anism. Pavan et al. [6] derives first-order conditions
under which incentive compatibility is guaranteed by
generalizing Mirrlees’s [7] envelope formula of static
mechanisms. Cavallo et al. [8] considers a dynamic
Markovian model and derives a sequence of Groves-
like payments which achieves Markov perfect equilib-
rium. Bapna and Weber [9] solves a sequential alloca-
tion problem by formulating it as a multi-armed ban-
dit problem. Parkes and Singh [10] and Friedman and
Parkes [11] consider an environment with randomly ar-
riving and departing agents and propose a “delayed”
VCG mechanism to guarantee interim incentive com-
patibility. Besanko et al. [12] and Battaglini et al. [13]
characterize the optimal infinite-horizonmechanism for
an agent modeled as a Markov process, with Besanko
considering a linear AR(1) process over a continuum of
states, and Battaglini focusing on a two-state Markov
chain. Farhadi et al. [14] propose a dynamic mecha-
nism that is incentive compatible, individual rational,
ex-ante budget balance and social efficient based on the
set of inference signals. However, their notion of in-
centive compatibility is in a weaker Nash sense, i.e.,
given other agents report truthfully, agent i’s best reac-
tion is to report truthfully. Our dynamic VCG mech-
anism on the other hand, guarantees incentive com-
patibility in weakly dominant strategies, i.e., irrespec-
tive of what other agents are bidding, agent i’s best
strategy is to report truthfully. Bergemann and Pavan
[15] have an excellent survey on recent research in dy-
namic mechanism design and a more recent survey pa-
per by Bergemann and Valimaki [16] further discusses
dynamic mechanism design problem with risk-averse
agents and the relationship between dynamic mecha-
nism and optimal contracts.
To our knowledge, there does not appear to be any
result that ensures dominance of dynamic truth-telling
for agents comprised of LQG systems.
3. The Static and Dynamic Deterministic
VCG
Let us begin by considering the simpler static de-
terministic case. Suppose there are N agents, with each
agent having a utility function Fi(ui), where ui is the
amount of energy produced/consumedby agent i. Fi(ui)
depends only on its own consumption/generation ui.
However, for convenience of notation, we will occa-
sionally abuse notation and write Fi(u)with the implicit
understanding that it only depends on the i-th compo-
nent ui of u.
Let u := (u1, ...,uN)
T , u−i :=
(u1, ...,ui−1,ui+1, ...,uN)
T , and let F := (F1, . . . ,Fn).
In the VCG mechanism, each agent is asked to bid
its utility function Fˆi. The agent can lie, so Fˆi may not
be equal to Fi. (As for F , we denote Fˆ := (Fˆ1, . . . Fˆn)).
After obtaining the bids, the ISO calculates u∗(Fˆ) as the
optimal solution to the following problem:
max
u
∑
i
Fˆi(ui)
subject to
∑
i
ui = 0.
The last equality ensures balance between generation
and consumption. Each agent is then assigned to pro-
duce/consume u∗i (Fˆ), and is obliged to do so, accruing
a utility Fi
(
u∗i
(
Fˆ
))
. Following the rules that it has an-
nounced a priori before receiving the bids, the ISO then
collects a payment pi(Fˆ) from agent i, defined as fol-
lows:
pi(Fˆ) := ∑
j 6=i
Fˆj(u
(i))−∑
j 6=i
Fˆj(u
∗),
where u(i) is defined as the optimal solution to the fol-
lowing problem:
max
u−i
∑
j 6=i
Fˆj(u j)
subject to
∑
j 6=i
u j = 0.
We can see that pi is the cost to the rest of the agents due
to agent i’s presence, which leads agents to internalize
the social externality.
In fact, the VCG mechanism is a special case of the
Groves mechanism [17], where payment pi is defined
as:
pi(Fˆ) = hi(Fˆ−i)−∑
j 6=i
Fˆj(u
∗(Fˆ)).
where hi is any arbitrary function and Fˆ−i :=
(Fˆ1, .., Fˆi−1, Fˆi+1, ..., FˆN). Truth-telling is a dominant
strategy in the Groves mechanism [17]. That is, regard-
less of other agents’ strategies, an agent cannot do better
than truthfully declaring its utility function.
Theorem 1. [17] Truth-telling (Fˆi≡ Fi) is the dominant
strategy equilibrium in Groves mechanism.
Proof. Suppose agent i announces the true utility func-
tion Fi. Let F¯ := (Fˆ1, ...Fˆi−1,Fi, Fˆi+1, ..., FˆN) and F¯−i :=
(Fˆ1, ...Fˆi−1, Fˆi+1, ..., FˆN). Let F¯(u) := ∑i F¯i(ui). Let u¯
∗
i
be what ISO assigns, and pi(F¯) be what ISO charges,
when F¯ is announced by the agents. Let u∗i be what
ISO assigns and pi(Fˆ) be what ISO charges when Fˆ is
announced by agents.
Note that F¯−i = Fˆ−i, and so hi(F¯−i) = hi(Fˆ−i).
Hence for agent i, the difference between the net util-
ities resulting from announcing Fi and Fˆi is[
Fi(u¯
∗
i )− pi(F¯)
]
−
[
Fi(u
∗
i )− pi(Fˆ)
]
=Fi(u¯
∗
i )− hi(F¯−i)+∑
j 6=i
Fˆj(u¯
∗
i )−Fi(u
∗
i )+ hi(Fˆ−i)
−∑
j 6=i
Fˆj(u
∗
i ) = F¯(u¯
∗)− F¯(u∗)≥ 0,
where the last inequality holds since u¯∗ is the optimal
solution to the social welfare problem with utility func-
tions F¯ .
The above VCG scheme can be extended to the im-
portant case of dynamic systems. We first consider the
deterministic case. This is a straightforward extension
of the static case since one can consider the sequence
of actions taken by an agent as a vector action. That is,
one can simply view the problem as an open-loop con-
trol problem, where the entire decision on the sequence
of controls to be employed is taken at the initial time,
and so treatable as a static problem.
For agent i, let Fi,t(xi(t),ui(t)) be the one-step util-
ity function at time t. Suppose that the state of agent i
evolves as:
xi(t+ 1) = gi,t(xi(t),ui(t)).
The ISO asks each agent i to bid its one-step util-
ity functions {Fˆi,t(xi(t),ui(t)), t = 0,1, . . . ,T − 1}, state
equation {gˆi,t , t = 0,1, . . . ,T − 1}, and initial condition
xˆi,0. The ISO then calculates (x
∗
i (t),u
∗
i (t)) as the op-
timal solution, assumed to be unique, to the following
utility maximization problem:
max
N
∑
i=1
T−1
∑
t=0
Fˆi(xi(t),ui(t))
subject to
xi(t+ 1) = gˆi(xi(t),ui(t)), for ∀i and ∀t,
N
∑
i=1
ui(t) = 0, for ∀t,
xi(0) = xˆi,0, for ∀i.
We denote this problem as (Fˆ , gˆ, xˆ0). We can extend the
notion of VCG payment pi to the deterministic dynamic
system as follow. Let
pi := ∑
j 6=i
T−1
∑
t=0
Fˆj(x
(i)
j (t),u
(i)
j (t))−∑
j 6=i
T−1
∑
t=0
Fˆj(x
∗
j (t),u
∗
j(t)).
Here (x
(i)
i (t),u
(i)
i (t)) is the optimal solution to the fol-
lowing problem, which is assumed to be unique:
max ∑
j 6=i
T−1
∑
t=0
Fˆj(x j(t),u j(t))
subject to
x j(t+ 1) = gˆ j(x j(t),u j(t)), for j 6= i and ∀t,
∑
j 6=i
u j(t) = 0, for ∀t,
x j(0) = xˆ j,0, for j 6= i.
More generally, we can consider a Groves payment pi
defined as:
pi := hi,t(Fˆ−i)−∑
j 6=i
T−1
∑
t=0
Fˆj(x
∗
j (t),u
∗
j(t)).
where hi,t is any arbitrary function. We first show in the
following theorem that truth-telling is still the dominant
strategy equilibrium in Groves mechanism.
Theorem 2. Truth-telling of utility function, state dy-
namics and initial condition (Fˆi = Fi, gˆi = gi and
xˆi,0 = xi,0) is a dominant strategy equilibrium under the
Groves mechanism for a dynamic system.
Proof. Let Fˆ := (Fˆ1, ..., Fˆi, ..., FˆN), gˆ :=
(gˆ1..., gˆi, ..., gˆN), and xˆ0 := (xˆ1,0, ..., xˆi,0, ..., xˆN,0).
Suppose agent i announces the true one-step utility
function Fi, true state dynamics gi, and true initial con-
dition xi,0. Let F¯ := (Fˆ1, ...Fˆi−1,Fi, Fˆi+1, ..., FˆN),
g¯ := (gˆ1, ...gˆi−1,gi, gˆi+1, ..., gˆN), and x¯0 :=
(xˆ1,0, ...xˆi−1,0,xi,0, xˆi+1,0, ..., xˆN,0). Let (x¯
∗
i (t), u¯
∗
i (t))
be what ISO assigns and pi(F¯ , g¯, x¯0) be what ISO
charges when (F¯ , g¯, x¯0) is announced by agents. Let
(x∗i (t),u
∗
i (t)) be what ISO assigns and pi(Fˆ , gˆ, xˆ0) be
what ISO charges when (Fˆ , gˆ, xˆ0) is announced by
agents. Let F¯(xi(t),ui(t)) := ∑i F¯i(xi(t),ui(t)).
For agent i, the difference between net utility re-
sulting from announcing (Fi,gi,xi,0) and (Fˆi, gˆi, xˆi,0) is[
∑
t
Fi(x¯
∗
i (t), u¯
∗
i (t))− pi(F¯ , g¯, x¯0)
]
−
[
∑
t
Fi(x
∗
i (t),u
∗
i (t))
− pi(Fˆ , gˆ, xˆ0)
]
= ∑
t
Fi(x¯
∗
i (t), u¯
∗
i (t))− hi,t(F¯−i)+∑
j 6=i
∑
t
Fˆj(x¯
∗
i (t), u¯
∗
i (t))
−∑
t
Fi(x
∗
i (t),u
∗
i (t))+ hi,t(Fˆ−i)−∑
j 6=i
∑
t
Fˆj(x
∗
i (t),u
∗
i (t))
= ∑
t
F¯(x¯∗i (t), u¯
∗
i (t))−∑
t
F¯(x∗i (t),u
∗
i (t))≥ 0,
since (x¯∗i (t), u¯
∗
i (t)) is the optimal solution to the prob-
lem (F¯ , g¯, x¯0).
4. The Dynamic Stochastic VCG
In the above section, we have shown that the VCG
mechanism can be naturally extended to dynamic deter-
ministic systems by employing an open-loop solution.
However, when agents are dynamic stochastic systems,
we need to consider closed-loop solutions. Such closed-
loop controls depend on the observations of the agents,
which are generally private. So the states of the sys-
tem are private random variables. Hence the problem
becomes one of additionally ensuring that each agents
reveals its “true” states at all times. This additional
complication appears to prevent a solution for general
systems. However, as we will see, in the case of LQG
agents one can indeed ensure the dominance of truth
telling strategies that reveal the true states. However,
it does not appear feasible to also then ensure that the
agents reveal their true state equations and cost func-
tions.
To obtain the correct payment structure, we will
need to carefully redefine the VCG payments such that
incentive compatibility is still assured for the special
case of linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) systems. As
noted above, one cannot treat the system as an open-
loop system as in the previous section. In particular, this
necessitates collecting payments from agents at each
step. For agent i, let wi ∼N (0,σi) be the discrete-time
additive Gaussian white noise process affecting state
xi(t) via:
xi(t+ 1) = aixi(t)+ biui(t)+wi(t),
where xi(0)∼N (0,ζi) and is independent of wi. Each
agent has a one-step utility function
Fi(xi(t),ui(t)) = qix
2
i (t)+ riu
2
i (t).
Let X(t) = [x1(t), ...,xN(t)]
T , U(t) = [u1(t), ...,uN(t)]
T
and W (t) = [w1(t), ...,wN(t)]
T . Let Q =
diag(q1, ...,qN) ≤ 0, R = diag(r1, ...,rN) < 0,
A = diag(a1, ...,aN), B = diag(b1, ...,bN),
Σ = diag(σ1, ...,σN) > 0 and Z = diag(ζ1, ...,ζN) > 0.
Let RSW := ∑Ni=1 ∑
T−1
t=0 [X
T (t)QX(t) + UT (t)RU(t)]
be the random variable denoting the social welfare of
the agents, and let SW := E[RSW ] denote the expected
social welfare. The random social welfare could also
be called the “ex-post social welfare”. The ISO aims to
maximize the social welfare, leading to the following
LQG problem:
max E
N
∑
i=1
T−1
∑
t=0
[
XT (t)QX(t)+UT(t)RU(t)
]
subject to
X(t+ 1) = AX(t)+BU(t)+W(t),
1TU(t) = 0, for ∀t, (1)
X(0)∼N (0,Z),W ∼N (0,Σ).
We will rewrite the random social welfare and thereby
the social welfare in terms more convenient for us. We
will decompose X(t) as:
X(t) :=
t
∑
s=0
X(s, t), 0≤ t ≤ T − 1, (2)
whereX(s,s) :=W (s−1) for s≥ 1 and X(0,0) :=X(0).
Let
X(s, t) := AX(s, t− 1)+BU(s, t− 1), 0≤ s≤ t− 1,
(3)
with U(s, t) yet to be specified. We suppose that U(t)
can also be decomposed as:
U(t) :=
t
∑
s=0
U(s, t), 0≤ t ≤ T − 1. (4)
Then regardless of how theU(s, t)’s are chosen, as long
as theU(s, t)’s for 0≤ s≤ t are indeed a decomposition
of U(t), i.e., (4) is satisfied, the random social welfare
can be written in terms of X(s, t)’s andU(s, t)’s as:
RSW =
T−1
∑
s=0
Ls,
where Ls for s≥ 1 is defined as:
Ls :=
T−1
∑
t=s
[
XT (s, t)QX(s, t)+UT (s, t)RU(s, t) (5)
+2
(
s−1
∑
τ=0
X(τ, t)
)
QX(s, t)+ 2
(
s−1
∑
τ=0
U(τ, t)
)
RU(s, t)
]
,
and L0 is defined as:
L0 :=
T−1
∑
t=0
[
XT (0, t)QX(0, t)+UT(0, t)RU(0, t)
]
.
Hence,
SW = E
T−1
∑
s=0
Ls.
In the scheme to follow the ISO will choose all
U(s, t)’s for different t’s at time s based on the infor-
mation it has at time s. (Note that t ≥ s). Hence X(s, t)
is completely determined by W (s− 1), and U(s, t) for
s ≤ t ≤ T − 1. Indeed X(s, t) can be regarded as the
contribution to X(t) of these variables.
Here we assume that the ISO knows the true system
parametersQ, R, A and B. This may hold if the ISO has
previously run the VCG bidding scheme for a dynamic
deterministic system, or equivalently, a day-ahead mar-
ket, and system parameters remain unchanged when
agents participate in the real-time stochastic market.
We will consider a scheme where at each stage, the
ISO asks the agents to bid their xi(s,s) (which is equal
towi(s−1)) at each time s, for 0≤ s≤ T−1. Let xˆi(s,s)
be what the agents actually bid, since they may not tell
the truth. Based on their bids xˆi(s,s) for 1 ≤ i≤ N, the
ISO solves the following problem:
max Ls
subject to
1TU(s, t) = 0, for s≤ t ≤ T − 1,
Xˆ(s,s) = [xˆ1(s,s), ..., xˆN (s,s)]
T
.
The variables Xˆ(s, t) for t > s are defined as Xˆ(s, t) =
AXˆ(s, t − 1)+ BU(s, t − 1), that is, with zero noise in
the state variable updates starting from the “initial con-
dition” Xˆ(s,s).
The interpretation is the following. Based on the
bids, Xˆ(s,s), which is supposedly a bid ofW (s−1), the
ISO calculates the trajectory of the linear systems from
time s onward, assuming zero noise from that point on.
It then allocates consumptions/generations U(s, t) for
future periods t for the corresponding deterministic lin-
ear system, with balance of consumption and produc-
tion (1) at each time t. These can be regarded as taking
into account the consequences of the disturbance occur-
ring at time s. More specifically, X(s, t) is the trajectory
resulting from the disturbanceW (s− 1) at time s, and
U(s, t) is the adjustment made at time s to allocation at
time t due to disturbance at time s.
Next, the ISO collects a payment pi(s) from agent
i at time s as:
pi(s) := hi(Xˆ−i(s,s))−∑
j 6=i
T−1
∑
t=s
[
q j xˆ
2
j(s, t)+ r ju
∗2
j (s, t)
+2q j
(
s−1
∑
τ=0
xˆ j(τ, t)
)
xˆ j(s, t)+ 2r j
(
s−1
∑
τ=0
u j(τ, t)
)
u∗j(s, t)
]
,
where Xˆ−i(s,s) = [xˆ1(s,s), ..., xˆi−1(s,s), xˆi+1(s,s), ...
, xˆN(s,s)]
T , and hi is any arbitrary function (as in the
Groves mechanism).
Before we prove incentive compatibility, we need
to define what is meant by the term “rational agents”.
Definition 1. Rational Agents: We say agent i is ratio-
nal at time T −1, if it adopts a dominant strategy, when
there is a unique dominant strategy. An agent i is ratio-
nal at time t if it adopts a dominant strategy at time t
under the assumption that all agents including itself are
rational at times t + 1, t + 2, ...,T − 1, when there is a
unique such dominant strategy.
Rationality is defined in a recursion fashion.
Theorem 3. Truth-telling of state xˆi(s,s) for 0 ≤ s ≤
T − 1, i.e., bidding xˆi(s,s) = wi(s− 1), is the unique
dominant strategy for the stochastic ISO mechanism, if
system parameters Q≤ 0, R< 0, A and B are truthfully
known, and agents are rational.
Proof. We show by backward induction. When agent i
is at the last stage T − 1, it is easy to verify that truth-
telling of state (noise) is dominant, i.e., xˆi(T − 1,T −
1) = xi(T −1,T−1). We next employ induction and so
assume that truth-telling of states is a dominant strategy
equilibrium at time k. If agents are rational, we can
take expectation over X(s,s), s ≥ k, and since optimal
feedback gain does not change with respect to time, the
cross terms cancel and agent i’s objective aligns with the
ISO’s. We conclude that truth-telling xˆi(k− 1,k− 1) =
xi(k− 1,k− 1) is the dominant strategy for agent i at
time k− 1.
5. Concluding Remarks
It remains an open problem how to construct a
mechanism that ensures the dominance of dynamic
truth-telling for agents comprised of general stochastic
dynamic systems. For the special case of LQG agents,
by careful construction of a sequence of layered VCG
payments over time, the intertemporal effect of cur-
rent bids on future payoffs can be decoupled, and truth-
telling of dynamic states is guaranteed if system param-
eters are known and agents are rational. Our results can
be generalized to LQG systems with partial state obser-
vation and time-varying cost and/or state dynamics.
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